Restore the bubblewrap diagnostic expected by Codex so its existing container fallback handles nspawn procfs restrictions. Verified workspace writes succeed and outside writes are denied. `check-system slop-cannon` passes.
8.7 KiB
slop-cannon
Coding agents (Claude Code and Codex), driven from the phone or a browser through
Paseo, running as a container on sfh.
- Source:
nixos/boxes/home/palace/vms/sfh/containers/slop-cannon.nix - Host: NixOS container on
sfh - nixpkgs:
mine
Role
- Runs the Paseo daemon and the agents it starts, all as the unprivileged user
slop-cannon. - Not a deploy-rs target (
my.deploy.enable = false): it's rendered viamy.asContainerand deployed withsfh. sfhgives the container a lowCPUWeight, aMemoryMaxand a larger/tmptmpfs for agent scratch files;/tmpcounts against the memory cap.
Network assignments
See the consolidated network assignments table (this box: slop-cannon).
A single MACVLAN interface, host0 on sfh's ctrs-hi, carries the hi assignment. Nothing
listens on it apart from SSH.
Users
| User | Purpose |
|---|---|
slop-cannon |
Runs Paseo and the agents; no wheel, locked password, Dev's SSH key; home persisted; UID/GID pinned in lib.my.c.ids |
dev |
Administration (doas); the usual primary user |
Both have Dev's SSH key; connect with the shared ssh aliases slop-cannon and slop-cannon-dev
(see SSH and first login).
Paseo
A daemon (paseo-server) that starts and manages agents and serves a WebSocket API to the Paseo
app, the web UI and the paseo CLI. Claude Code runs through the Claude Agent SDK, using the
installed claude and its claude.ai login; Codex runs through codex app-server.
Service
- The upstream
services.paseomodule (flake inputpaseo, pinned to a release, imported innixos/modules/common.nix), with a package override for the web UI bug getpaseo/paseo#7673. - Runs as
slop-cannon, so agents use that user's logins and settings, with~/.paseoasPASEO_HOME. - The daemon password comes from the age secret
slop-cannon/paseo.env(PASEO_PASSWORD=…). Read it withragenix -e secrets/slop-cannon/paseo.env.age. - The service is not restarted on deploy, so running agents aren't interrupted. Restart it by hand
(
doas systemctl restart paseo) to pick up a new config; stopping it stops its agents. - Startup takes about a minute and a half while bundled plugins load; the daemon answers 503 until it is ready.
Settings
services.paseo.settings is rewritten into ~/.paseo/config.json on every start, so changes made
from the app don't survive a restart. It:
- disables the tools Paseo injects into agents (
daemon.mcp.injectIntoAgents = false), which would let an agent change its own mode, answer its own permission prompts or open terminals; - requires relay replay protection;
- turns off dictation and voice, which would otherwise download a large local speech model;
- hides providers other than Claude and Codex;
- adds a "Claude, accept edits" agent profile. Each provider's default mode is hardcoded upstream
(Claude
auto, Codexauto-review), and profiles are the only way to preset one.
Connectivity
- The daemon listens on
127.0.0.1:6767only. The phone app and the browser reach it through our relay onmiddleman(paseo-relay.nul.ie). - Traffic through the relay is end-to-end encrypted between the app and the daemon; the relay sees only addresses, timing and sizes. The pairing QR code or link is the trust anchor; treat it like a password. Switching relays means re-pairing.
- Push notifications go from the daemon to Expo's push service (
exp.host), one outbound request per notification carrying its text. - In a browser, open the link
paseo daemon pairprints.app.baseUrlpoints it at our copy of the web app onpaseo.nul.ie, served bymiddleman, instead ofapp.paseo.sh. The daemon's own web UI stays off, so nothing needs to reach the daemon directly. - Opening a pairing link in the address bar adds the host without asking for the daemon password, and the host page then shows "Password required" with no way to enter it. Instead, use the app's option to paste a pairing link, which prompts for the password; remove a host added the other way first.
State
Paseo keeps only its own records in ~/.paseo: config.json, the daemon keypair and local
credentials, one record per agent under agents/, registered projects and workspaces, and the git
worktrees it creates under worktrees/. Conversations stay in the providers' own stores: a Claude
agent is a normal session under ~/.claude/projects/, a Codex agent a normal rollout under
~/.codex/sessions/.
Repos, worktrees and jj
Repos live under ~/src as colocated jj clones (see slop-clone below). Paseo only calls git:
- A
localworkspace runs the agent in the checkout itself;jjand Paseo's git views see the same changes. Use it for work you want to steer withjj. - A worktree workspace is a
git worktreeunder~/.paseo/worktreeson its own branch. Use it for unattended agents. Archiving it removes the worktree with--force, losing uncommitted work. - Archiving a
localworkspace removes only Paseo's record; the folder is kept. - Only one colocated working copy per repo is possible, so parallel jj-driven work needs separate clones.
- Don't run
jjin a folder while an agent is mid-turn there: jj snapshots its partial edits.
Terminal access
- The
paseoCLI talks to the running daemon:paseo ls,paseo logs -f <id>,paseo send <id> "…",paseo permit ls|allow|deny. It is command-line only, not a chat interface. - A session can be taken over in the provider's own TUI by its ID:
claude --resume <session>in the agent's folder, orcodex resume <session>.paseo importgoes the other way. This is a hand-off, not a shared view: stop the agent in Paseo first and don't type in both.
Agent permissions
Paseo has the full rights of slop-cannon: anyone with the daemon password or a pairing can start
agents in any mode, answer prompts and open terminals. The boundaries are the container, the
unprivileged user and the approval broker in front of the deploy key.
- Claude Code and Codex come from the shared
my.agentshome-manager module. - Claude's user settings deny raw
deploy,ssh-machineand.keys/, and ask beforeslop-deploy/slop-ssh. These match command text, so they steer agents rather than enforce a boundary. - Claude's managed settings (
/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json) repeat thedenyrules and disable bypass mode; agents can edit~/.claudebut not/etc. The app still lists Bypass, but choosing it fails. - Codex stores its credentials in a file. A bubblewrap diagnostic compatibility override enables its existing nspawn fallback; deployed and verified directly and through a fresh Paseo session. See Codex sandbox in nspawn.
- Deploys and
ssh-machineaccess are meant to go through an approval broker, which is not built yet; until then agents can't deploy.
SSH and first login
slop-cannon is not a deploy node, so ssh-machine can't reach it; SSH to
slop-cannon-ctr.h.nul.ie directly. Never forward your SSH agent into the box: agents could use
it while you're logged in. As a last resort, ssh-machine sfh and
doas machinectl shell root@slop-cannon.
The box has one Git key, ~slop-cannon/.ssh/id_ed25519, generated on first boot. Add its public key
in Gitea as a write-enabled deploy key on each repo agents may use. Commits are authored as Dev
through the shared Git config.
First login, once, over ssh slop-cannon:
claude auth login(a full login;setup-tokentokens are not enough for every feature).codex login --device-auth.paseo daemon pair, then scan the QR code with the Paseo app. The pairing link carries the relay endpoint.slop-clone <owner>/<repo>for each repo. It clones a colocated jj repo into~/src/<repo>, registers it with Paseo as a local workspace, and prints the box's public key if Gitea refuses the clone.
Notable config files
nixos/boxes/home/palace/vms/sfh/containers/slop-cannon.nix— container system: users, Paseo, Claude settings,slop-clone.home-manager/modules/agents/default.nix— shared Claude Code and Codex configuration.nixos/boxes/home/palace/vms/sfh/default.nix— thesfhside: container instance, MACVLAN, CPU, memory and/tmplimits.